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Abstract
MOSHIER, MEREDITH: The Six-Year Hangover: An Assessment of the Effectiveness
of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Dealing with Debt Overhang within the U.S.
Economy. Department of Economics, 2015
ADVISOR: Eshragh Motahar
After the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2008, the Federal Reserve and the federal
government used monetary and fiscal policy to buoy the economy out of the recession,
but the Fed had to turn to non-standard forms of monetary policy, or unconventional
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve used forward guidance, quantitative easing, and
the maturity extension program to: lower interest rates, raise inflation expectations, and
increase GDP. Six years after the Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve has begun to taper
from unconventional monetary policy. Yet, there has been much debate as to whether
unconventional monetary policy is effective or not, and whether the Federal Reserve used
these policies for “too” long.
This paper argues that debt overhang is preventing unconventional monetary
policy from being effective. Debt overhang is a debt burden that is so great that an entity
cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects. For instance, when the housing
bubble burst, home values dropped below the mortgage value leaving individuals with
less equity, even negative equity, contributing to debt overhang. Through regression and
graphical analysis, the results indicate that unconventional monetary policy stimulates
investment and consumption, while debt overhang has a significant impact on investment
and consumption. Therefore, the low interest rate environment that the unconventional
monetary policy creates is not stimulating investment and consumption because market
participants are trying to save money.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Although the tapering of quantitative easing began in December 2013, the Federal
Reserve is still using unconventional monetary policies. On January 28, 2015, the Federal
Reserve noticed that labor markets have been strong and investments have been
increasing. However, the FOMC also stated, “The committee continues to see the risks to
the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as nearly balanced.”1 This means
that they expect inflation to decline further in the near term. Consequently, the Federal
Reserve maintained that it continues to target interest rates at 0 to a ¼ percent and
holding of agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury securities at auction
until inflation climbs up to two percent.
Nevertheless, why, after six years since the Great Recession, is the Federal
Reserve still not taking its foot completely off the pedal of unconventional monetary
policy? At the Senate Banking Committee, Janet Yellen stated, “There has been
important progress. However, despite this improvement, too many Americans remain
unemployed or underemployed, wage growth is still sluggish and inflation remains well
below our longer-run objective.”2 This paper argues that debt overhang constrains many
Americans from being able to participate in normal consumption and investment
behavior, resulting in a slow economic recovery. Thus, while the Federal Reserve

1

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. FOMC. Press Release. FRB: --FOMC Statement—
January 28, 2015. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm>.
2
Applebaum, Bynyamin. "Fed’s Janet Yellen, in Testimony, Counsels Patience on Interest Rate Increase."
The New York Times, February 24, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/economy/fedchief-yellen-testifies-before-congress.html?_r=0.
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continues to implement unconventional monetary policy, debt overhang prevents this
policy from being effective.
Debt overhang is a term used to describe a debt burden that is so great, an entity
cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects. Debt overhang is measured in
!"#$

one of two ways: a ratio of  !"#$%& or a ratio

!!"  !""#$"
!"#$%&

. After the financial crisis, there

were serious changes to individuals’ balance sheets, due to a multitude of events. In the
years before the crisis, there was a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in America.
Loans were lent out to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit histories who struggled to
repay their loans. These risky mortgages were passed on to financial engineers at big
banks, who put these mortgages together in pools masked them as low-risk, high yielding
securities, and then sold them to investors. However, these high yielding, supposedly
“safe assets,” like mortgage-backed securities, were not stable investments. In 2006,
when home values dropped, people could no longer pay their mortgages, so mortgagebacked securities dropped in value, and safe CDOs became worthless, despite the ratings
agencies’ seal of approval. As a result, complex chains of debt between counterparties
spread and Americans and financial institutions were left with huge amounts of debt.
Conventional monetary and fiscal policies were implemented in mid- 2007 and
2008 to buoy the sinking ship of the American economy. The fiscal efforts to end the
recession and jump-start the recovery were built around a series of stimulus measures.
First, income tax rebate checks were mailed to households in early 2008 to increase
Americans’ disposable income. Then, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 was enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis. Within this legislation was
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which authorized the United States Secretary

2

of Treasury to spend up to $700 billion on distressed assets, such as mortgage-backed
securities, and supply cash directly to the banks. The funds to purchase distressed assets
were mostly redirected to inject capital into banks and other financial institutions, while
the Treasury continued to examine the usefulness of targeted asset purchases. Next, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) passed in early 2009. The economic
stimulus package with an estimated cost of $787 billion was later revised to be $831
billion between 2009 and 2011. The Act included direct spending in infrastructure,
education, health, energy, federal tax incentives, and expansion of unemployment
benefits and other social welfare provisions.3
In conjunction with fiscal efforts, the Fed lowered interest rates aggressively in
2008 to decrease interest rates, increase GDP, and decrease unemployment rates.
However, by adopting a near-zero interest rate policy in 2008, there was a liquidity trap,
where monetary policy was not translating to increased price level. Therefore, the Fed
had to implement nonstandard forms of monetary policy to fulfill their goals. The Fed’s
policies were broken down as such: first, the communication policies using forward
guidance gave people confidence in the economy. Second, the Fed increased the size and
the composition of its balance sheet. This has been done by large-scale asset purchases,
referred to as quantitative easing, of Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and
agency mortgage-backed securities. Lastly, through the Fed’s “Maturity Extension
Program,” the central bank was able to purchase $667 billion in long-term U.S. treasury
securities and sell an equivalent amount of short-term Treasury securities. Table 1
indicates the various rounds of unconventional monetary policy.
3

"Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic
Output from October 2011 Through December 2011." CBO, 2012.
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/02-22-ARRA.pdf.
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Table 1: Implementation of Unconventional Monetary Policy

Source: The Federal Reserve
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1.1 The Federal Reserve Unconventional Actions
These policies were used before in the U.S., although not to the same degree as
the recent crisis, economic literature has found that unconventional monetary policies are
effective in times of economic crisis. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) point out that when a
central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions,
the central bank must rely on “nonstandard” policy alternatives, or unconventional
monetary policy. They discovered that these policies affect asset prices and yields, and as
a result increase aggregate demand. Ultimately, the theories that Bernanke and Reinhart
analyzed in their 2004 paper, led Bernanke to implement these policies in 2008.
As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Bernanke was concerned with providing
liquidity to the economy, to ensure that GDP would grow, and unemployment rates
would decline. Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2013) found significant results
with the implementation of unconventional monetary policy. They found that when
expansionary unconventional monetary policy is applied, there is a substantial, and
temporary rise in economic output and prices. To increase output and prices, it was
important for the Federal Reserve to decrease interest rates to stimulate this output. In
particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examined the effects of
quantitative easing on lowered interest rates, which influenced preferences for safer
assets, higher expectations of inflation, and lower corporate bond risk
Aside from just using quantitative easing (QE) as a way to influence
macroeconomic behavior, the FOMC forward guidance was also a beneficial tool for the
Federal Reserve to use. Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) empirically
illustrated that FOMC policy announcements substantially decrease Treasury bond rates,
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increase corporate borrowing rates, and influence private macroeconomic forecasts. Thus,
forward guidance is a great tool for the Federal Reserve to use, in addition to quantitative
easing.
Although financial institutions were stabilized and some positive outcomes
affected the economy, literature suggests that unconventional monetary policy was not
fully effective. These policies seemed to have lost steam around 2010 and 2011. Putnam
(2013) states that the Fed’s QE programs from 2011 onward did little to nothing in
assisting the U.S. economy. He found that economic growth remains constrained because
the shock of the earlier financial panic left long-lasting changes to risk preferences. Thus,
it is because of these negative signals that economic confidence has been diminished.
Labonte (2014) argues that the sluggish rate of economic recovery raises
questions about the optimal approach to monetary policy. Labonte suggests that monetary
policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment after a
severe financial crisis. Labonte specifically argues that the Fed continued to pursue these
policies in spite of modest improvements, such that inflation has increased, but has not
reached its two percent target. Friedman (2014) also argues that fiscal policy was not
fully utilized after the financial crisis, which could have stimulated jobs and wage growth
more quickly. Friedman (2014) and Labonte (2014) both agree that unconventional
monetary policy has led to above-average growth in the money supply, posing a threat to
price stability in the future.
1.2 The Aftermath of Debt Overhang
Additional literature has suggested that because of debt overhang; the Federal
Reserve did not need to pump liquidity into financial markets for six years. Martin Wolf
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(2014) explains that there is a misconception of what type of crisis erupted in 2008. The
economists identified the financial crisis with old-fashioned bank runs by depositors.
Instead, the crisis was not a crisis of confidence, but a crisis of indebtedness. In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, Paul Krugman (2009) explains more explicitly how
recovery is bound to be a prolonged process. He states that the global credit system is in a
state of paralysis and two things need to be addressed. The first is that credit needs to be
flowing and the second is that spending needs to be stimulated. Credit has been flowing
due to the Fed pumping liquidity into the economy, but to increase consumer spending,
more needs to be done. Krugman stresses the importance of very large fiscal stimuli,
insisting that infrastructure, healthcare, education, and autos are big enough to
overwhelm systemic and psychological depression.
Boshara and Emmons (2013) discuss how the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009
was damaging to household balance sheets. In particular, they examined the importance
of sound financial footing to families at the micro-level and the importance of healthy
household balance sheets to the economy. The lack of savings and assets can hurt future
consumption and security. They consider the huge declines in asset values and net worth
as one of the shocks that threw the economy into a recession. In addition, the liability side
of household balance sheets could be a future detriment to the economy, in regards to
default and deleveraging.
This paper will thus tie together unconventional monetary policy and debt
overhang, and discuss their relationship after the financial crisis. Ultimately, if debt
overhang is preventing nonstandard forms of monetary policy from being effective. The
next chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature on the effectiveness of
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unconventional monetary policy and the effects of debt and deleveraging. The third
chapter is an analytical framework of debt overhang, unconventional monetary policy,
and fiscal policy. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between unconventional
monetary policy and debt overhang, through the graphical and regression analysis of this
relationship. The fifth and final chapter concludes the study and discusses how
unconventional monetary policy effectiveness is hampered due to the terms of debt
overhang.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter outlines the literature discussing unconventional monetary policy
and debt overhang. However, before the relationship between unconventional monetary
policy and debt overhang can be explained, it is imperative to note how central banks
orchestrate monetary policy. The first section, Conventional Monetary Policy, explains
how a central bank determines the size and the rate of growth of the money supply, which
in turn affects interest rates to either stimulate GDP or slow down inflation. The second
section, Unconventional Monetary Policy Fundamentals, discusses the various ways that
make unconventional monetary policy effective. In addition, this section will discuss the
weaknesses of these policy instruments. The third and final section, The Ties Between
Debt Overhang and Unconventional Monetary Policy, explains the role that debt and
debt overhang play in the financial crisis, both before and after.
2.1 Conventional Monetary Policy
There are two channels in which monetary policy is executed, one is through
instruments and the other is through monetary targets. Instrument tools are tools used by
the central bank to adjust price or quantity to affect GDP, unemployment, and inflation;
while monetary targets are assigned variables by the central bank that they cannot set
directly, but over time can exert substantial influence over the economy.
Friedman (1988) details how the instruments and targets of monetary policy affect
the economy in direct and indirect ways. For example, instruments of monetary policy
include: the reserve requirements or portions of deposits that banks must maintain, either
in their vaults or on deposit, at a Federal Reserve Bank; open market operations which
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varies the supply of such reserves through buying and selling securities; the discount rate,
which is the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve to depository institutions on
short term loans; lending reserves directly to banks; and/or regulating aspects of banking
and financial activities. These policies influence interest rates and money supply, which
in turn affects the economy. For example, expansionary open market operations can
affect aggregate demand and supply during periods of recession. For instance, when the
Fed buys Treasury bonds it increases the money supply. This shifts the demand for bonds
and raises the price of bonds, reducing the interest rate. The lower interest rate stimulates
investment, reduces the demand for and increases the supply of dollars in the currency
market. The combined impact of greater investment and net exports will shift the
aggregate demand curve to the right. This example of open market operations is
illustrated in Appendix A to show how interest rates and the money supply affect output
and price level.
In addition to instruments, targets of monetary policy are used when the central
banks use the liability side of the balance sheet, like bank reserves, the monetary base,
and currency, to indirectly affect the economy over a certain horizon of time. This
influences other factors that affect GDP, unemployment and inflation. For instance, when
an expansion in the monetary base gives financial institutions the ability to loan out more
money, this indirectly stimulates investment because the commercial banks’ willingness
to lend should increase individuals’ willingness to invest. Friedman states, “This
realization of the intermediate target is then part of the information set underlying the
choice of a final value for the policy instrument.” Thus, these monetary policy tools are
useful when other policy actions take too long to affect economic behavior. The next
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section highlights the needs for non-standard forms of monetary policy when the Federal
Reserve cannot decrease interest rates anymore through its normal tools.
2.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Fundamentals
Before Ben Bernanke became Chairman of the Federal Reserve, he published
numerous academic articles. Bernanke’s particular interest was in the economic and
political events of the Great Depression. Much of his work is inspired by the monetarist
theory of Milton Friedman. Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand
management.4 He wrote extensively on the Great Depression, or as he called it, the Great
Contraction. Friedman argued that it had been caused by an ordinary financial shock
whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of
the money supply.
Due to the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve, the Fed was
tightening and depriving banks of liquidity, where it instead should have loosened and
pumped money into the system. For example, Friedman and his colleague, Anna
Schwartz, noted that one of the first stages of contraction had severe implications on the
economy. From the spring of 1928 to the crash of October 1929, the Fed raised the
discount rate and decreased the holdings of government securities. This tightening of
policy, although intended to put an end to stock market speculation, was inevitably
followed by falling prices and weaker economic activity. From the cyclical peak in
August 1929 to the crash in October 1929—production, wholesale prices, and personal
income fell at an annual rate of 20 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5 percent, respectively.5
Friedman maintained that monetary mechanics are very important to stabilize the
4

"Milton Friedman (1912-2006)." The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Liberty Fund.
Bernanke, Ben. "On Milton Friedman's Ninetieth Birthday." Speech, At the Conference to Honor Milton
Friedman from The Federal Reserve Board , Chicago , November 8, 2002.
5
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economy, and keep people afloat in an economic crisis. As Ben Bernanke stated on
Friedman’s ninetieth birthday, “I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the
Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't
do it again.”
Therefore, in a crisis like the Great Depression, monetary policy is an important
foundational instrument to stabilize the economy. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) also
point out that when a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further
interest-rate reductions, the central bank must rely on “nonstandard” policy alternatives,
or unconventional monetary policy. They examined how implementing communication
policies leveraged the effectiveness of other unconventional monetary policies, like the
size and change in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet through the
targeted purchases of long-term bonds as a means of reducing the long-term interest rate.
All of these factors were used to shape public expectations about the future course of
interest rates. For instance, lower interest rates keep individuals investing and consuming
goods and services. At the time of this publication, they looked at three recent episodes of
economic crisis in the U.S. and Japan to provide important insight on the potential
effectiveness of various nonstandard policies. They discovered that these policies may
affect asset prices and yields, and consequently, aggregate demand.
They noted that these policies used in the U.S. were significantly effective for
their intended outcomes. For instance, quantitative easing was used in the debt buybacks
of late 1990s, the massive purchase of U.S. Treasury securities between 2000 and 2003,
and the Fed’s target purchases of U.S. Treasuries as an anti-deflationary measure in 2003.
The event-study analyses of these episodes, as well as the comparison of actual Treasury

12

yields during these periods, suggest that large changes in the relative supplies of
securities have significant effects on their yields. Most importantly, they found that
shaping investor expectations through the Federal Reserve’s communication is an
effective strategy in persuading the public that the policy rate will remain low for a
longer period of time. Central bankers thus can reduce long-term rates and can increase
activity in the economy. Figure 1 shows the intended effects of unconventional monetary
policy to increase investment, consumption, and exports, which ultimately increase
output growth, inflation, and wages.
Figure 1: Transmission Mechanism of Unconventional Monetary Policy

Source: World Economic Forum
After analyzing economic theory and adhering to Milton Friedman’s ideology,
Bernanke implemented unconventional monetary policies in 2008. Gambacorta,
Hofmann, and Peersman (2013) also found significant results with the implementation of
13

unconventional monetary policy. After, central banks exhausted their conventional
methods, interest rates reached the zero-lower bound. Gambacorta, et al were interested
in the effects of unconventional monetary methods during the crisis period. They found
that when expansionary unconventional monetary policy is applied, there is a substantial,
temporary rise in economic output and prices. These results suggest that the
unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by central banks in the wake of the
global financial crisis provide temporary support to their economies.
In particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examined the
elements of quantitative easing (QE), and specifically, the effects of purchasing various
long term Treasuries and bonds on interest rates. They explained that the Fed’s success is
based on many facets. The first is large asset purchases, which signal that the Fed will be
involved in supporting the economy for an extended period of time. The second is to
change investor preferences from long-term duration to short-term duration, by
decreasing long-term yields, investing in more liquid assets, and investing in safer assets.
The third is to decrease default and risk premium and to increase inflation expectation.
With these measurements, they were able to inspect if QE was effective.
Their results reveal particular details about each round of QE. They found that
QE1 involved large purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities, which reduced the
price of mortgage-specific risk. While QE2 involved only Treasury purchases and left a
substantial decrease on Treasury and Agency bond rates, as well as had smaller effects on
mortgage-backed security rates and corporate rates. QE1 affected the equilibrium price
for mortgage-specific risk and decreased the default and risk premium for corporate
bonds contributing to lower corporate rates. Ultimately, yields on medium and long
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maturity safe bonds fell because of demand for safe nominal assets. The Fed purchases of
mortgage-backed securities reduced the supply of such assets and thus increased the
equilibrium of safety-premium. Yet both QE1 and QE2, with evidence from inflation
swap rates and IPS, increased inflation expectations; thus QE was effective in reducing
interest rates, lowering risk, changing investing behavior, and raising inflation
expectation.
Another implementation of unconventional monetary policy is the FOMC public
statements, or forward guidance, which can “substitute for lower interest rates at the zero
lower bound.”6 Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) empirically illustrate the
responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC forward
guidance, both prior to and since the recent financial crisis. Their results indicate that the
FOMC has extensive experience successfully forecasting its intended adjustments to
evolving macroeconomic conditions, thereby providing additional policy
accommodation. For example, they show that surprises associated with FOMC policy
announcements substantially influence Treasury bond rates, corporate borrowing rates,
and private macroeconomic forecasts. Yet, news of substantial monetary tightening raises
interest rates as expected, while also raising inflation forecasts and lowering
unemployment forecasts. Thus, while forward guidance is not entirely a sure way of
predicting economic outcomes, it is an important tool for the central bank to convey
reliable information about future monetary policy actions and influence market
participants.
6

Campbell, Jeffrey R., Charles L Evans, Jonas D.M. Fisher, and Alejandro Justiniano. "Macroeconomic
Effects of FOMC Forward Guidance." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2012, 1-77.
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/spring-2012/2012a_evans.pdf>.
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After the financial crisis, Chodorow-Reich (2012) discovered a positive
correlation between a direct credit supply to financial institutions and the employment for
non-financial firms. The major institutional failures during the financial crisis, from the
fall of assets of the Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas funds to the bankruptcy of Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, all resulted from exposure to real estate, mortgage
securities, and funding structure. Following these market events, the Federal Reserve and
federal government reacted with certain bailout policies. These policies included: an $85
billion loan from the New York Federal Reserve Bank to the insurer AIG; the forced
sales of the investment bank, Merrill Lynch and the commercial bank, Wachovia; and
direct capital injections by the federal government into major financial institutions
through the TARP. Chodorow-Reich argues that those relief efforts were necessary,
because if banks did not have the ability to lend, financial and non-financial firms’
interest rates on loans would increase, and thus affect the employment at institutions. In
his sample, he found that the withdrawal of credit accounts resulted in one-third to onehalf of the employment decline at small and medium sized firms in the year following the
Lehman bankruptcy. In addition, Chodorow-Reich (2014) discovered how
unconventional monetary policies helped to stabilize the financial sector and the
economy after the financial crisis. In particular, Chodorow-Reich found that in the winter
of 2008 to 2009 unconventional monetary policy was effective when it came to
stabilizing financial institutions after the financial crisis. It had a strong, stabilizing
impact on banks and especially on life insurance companies. The results were consistent
with the positive effects on legacy asset prices and future business. Chodorow- Reich
states, “The positive effects on life insurers, in particular, suggest a recapitalizing channel
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of monetary policy.” So, unconventional monetary was important in supplying financial
institutions with liquidity.
Although unconventional monetary policy was crucial in the initial downfall of
the economy during the financial crisis, there are still some weaknesses to these policies.
Some literature suggests that unconventional monetary policy seemed to have lost steam
around 2010 to 2011. Putnam (2013) states that the Fed’s QE programs from 2011
onward did little to nothing in assisting the U.S. economy. He found that economic
growth remains constrained because there are long-lasting changes to risk preferences
from the shock of the earlier financial panic. Due to those negative signals, it in turn
affects economic confidence. For instance, the continuation of zero short-term interest
rates, expansion of QE, and lower long-term rates can have a very depressing impact on
certain demographics, in terms of their savings and consumption behavior, in the
aftermath of a financial crisis.
For example, many retirees and pension funds depend on fixed income
investments as a source of income. Reducing rates paid on short-term and cash equivalent
investments reduce individual’s income because of the lower expected returns from their
retirement portfolio. This forces current and future retirees into a state of decreased
consumption as a means to increase savings. In essence, zero short-term rate policies
coupled with QE and lower long-term rates imply a redistribution of wealth away from
savers and into the hands of borrowers. However, these borrowers, especially corporate
borrowers, are not likely to expand their businesses during periods of heightened
uncertainty, regardless of how low the interest rates may be. Putnam argues that the
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sensitivity of the economy, during the post-crisis recovery phase, must be at the heart of
any QE efficacy evaluation.
In addition, Chodorow-Reich (2014) mentioned that the Fed is potentially losing
its control over the policies that influence the economy, because some of the policies did
not produce their intended result. One example of an unsuccessful unconventional
monetary policy is the Maturity Extension Program, implemented after QE II. Ma (2013)
explains that the Maturity Extension Program or “Operational Twist,” was intended to
lower long-term interest rates. In this operation, the Fed sold short-term Treasury bonds
and bought long-term Treasury bonds, which pressured the long-term bond yields
downward and the short-term bond yields upward. Unlike QE, the Maturity Extension
Program had no effect on the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, bank reserves, or the
monetary base. This is because it is constrained in size by the amount of short-term
securities the Fed holds. Operation Twist was intended to drive down long-term interest
rates, so there would be more of an incentive for short-term investments, and most
importantly no long-term risk to the central bank’s balance sheet. Ma states, “In terms of
unemployment, inflation rate reductions, and the promotion of economic growth, the
effects of Operation Twist are not significant.” Based on Ma’s data, the results indicate
that Operation Twist was ineffective at increasing short-term interests rates, thus not
aiding in the boost of economic output.
Furthermore, other literature suggests that there are big picture weaknesses to
unconventional monetary policies. These faults are not only causing problems for the
future economy, but are not addressing the current problem of debt overhang. Labonte
(2014) argues that the sluggish rate of economic recovery raises questions about the

18

optimal approach to monetary policy. Labonte suggests that unconventional monetary
policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment after a
severe financial crisis. What is particularly interesting about Labonte’s argument is that
the Fed continued to pursue these policies in spite of modest improvements. Although the
unemployment rate has been on a downward trajectory, the inflation rate has remained
below the 2 percent target. These slow improvements raise concerns and long-term
consequences arise, because unconventional policy has led to above-average growth in
the money supply, which arguably poses a threat to price stability.
In terms of interest rates, Labonte argues that it is less clear if QE has successfully
executed the reductions of other private interest rates to thereby stimulate economic
activity. That is because the spread between corporate and Treasury bonds remains
greater than it was in the years before the crisis. Labonte states, “It should be noted that
announcement effects measure what financial markets believe that QE will do to interest
rates ex ante, and not what QE has done to interest rates ex post.” This indicates that
lowering nominal interest rates are not actually causing a decrease in real interest rates.
Labonte explains that $1 trillion in asset purchases only reduced long-term interest rates
by a range of 0.25 percentage points to 1.72 percentage points. Another example of
inefficiency is the QE goals of inducing spending and discouraging saving. One
economic problem is when the economy is far below full employment, which has been
the case since the financial crisis and there is not enough spending in the economy to
utilize the economy’s productive capacity. If QE “worked,” the evidence would
presumably be higher interest rates, higher inflation, or higher inflation expectations.
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Labonte argues that overall, unconventional monetary policy results have not worked and
the Fed should have looked for policies that did work.
2.3 The Ties Between Debt Overhang and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Perhaps unconventional monetary policies were the wrong tools used to fix the
economic problem. Wolf (2014) explains that there is a misconception of what type of
crisis erupted in 2008. He states that there is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The
central bank identified the financial crisis with old-fashioned bank runs by depositors, but
such bank runs have become outdated because of deposit insurance. Wolf explains that
by 2008, depository institutions were no longer the dominant form of financing. Instead,
finance increasingly saw the prevalence of “shadow-banking.” These financial
intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit across the global financial
system, yet they were not subject to regulatory oversight. The shadow banking systems
are embedded in regulated institutions that participate in unregulated activities. So, after
the financial crisis, businesses and households were exposed to debt, leaving the
economy to the possibility of a self-reinforcing downward spiral. Thus, this crisis was not
a crisis of confidence; but a crisis of indebtedness, as a result running more debt to ease
consumer worries is not that effective in supporting Americans on their road to recovery
from this debt hangover.
For instance, Koo (2013) also emphasizes that the wrong policies were used
during the wrong time. He explains that during a crisis, monetary policy is highlighted for
profit maximization, and fiscal policy is necessary for debt minimization. Although
interest rates were low and there was plenty of liquidity, private households were not
interested in borrowing. For example, the U.S. private sector went from a net borrower of
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funds with 5.3 percent of GDP in Q4 2008 to a net saver of funds with 8.4 percent of Q1
GDP in 2010, despite the lowest interest rates in U.S. history. This stagnant or negative
credit growth meant that the liquidity injected by the central banks could not enter the
real economy to support private sector activities. Koo explains that indebtedness nullifies
the efforts of unconventional monetary policy.
Similarly, Friedman (2014) also criticizes unconventional monetary policy.
Although unconventional monetary policy is a “fashionable tool,” it is not necessarily an
effective one. He thinks that fiscal policy was not fully utilized and monetary policy was
completely exhausted. He is concerned that central banks hold large amounts of assets
because there has only been attention directed at short-term results of monetary policy.
The long-term consequences have been forgotten about, like the consequence of running
a high debt. In addition to this, central banks have massive liabilities on their balance
sheet, which could cause serious issues and instabilities for the economy in the future. As
a result, there could be long-term problems when it comes to unwinding unconventional
monetary policy. For example, the economy is operating with a central bank’s balance
sheet that is distorted and can potentially cause another recession.
These long-term consequences are touched upon when Putnam (2013) discusses
the other negative implications of unconventional monetary policy. Putnam explains that
the Fed’s exit from QE is likely to be highly complex. He describes a number of
problems; involving delays in returning to a more traditional short-term interest rate
policy, dramatically diminished contributions to the U.S. Treasury from central bank net
earnings, and the potentially large unrealized portfolio losses. For example, the Fed’s
substantial amount of unrealized losses on its portfolio could exceed $62 billon paid-in
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and equity capital, making the Fed essentially insolvent. In addition, over time as the
U.S. Congress increases its oversight concerning the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, the
Fed might lose some of their autonomy
Krugman and Eggertsson (2012) also think that there will be difficulties when it
comes to unwinding unconventional monetary policy, there will be a deleveraging shock,
which will increase the confusion regarding policy implementation, more so than usual.
They also discovered, when viewed through the lens of their model, many of the usual
rules of macroeconomics become reversed, because the past recession was driven by
debt. They use the term “paradox of toil” and “paradox of flexibility,” because
unconventional monetary policy attempts to encourage Americans into consumption, but
Americans want to save due to their debt. So while aggregate demand and supply is
suppose to shift out, increasing output and prices, in actuality it can reduce output, and
flexible wages can increase unemployment. This phenomenon studied indicates that wage
and price flexibility do not facilitate recovery from recessions during a liquidity trap, but
actually impair them. However, Krugman and Eggertsson explain that expansionary
fiscal policy should be effective in combatting those impacts. Government spending
would increase the price level and increasing aggregate supply. Thus fiscal expansion
will be able to sustain output and employment while private balance sheets are repaired,
and the government can pay down its own debt after the deleveraging period has come to
an end.
What is the significance of a financial crisis and debt overhang? They are both
systemic and psychological repercussions of the risk that is debt. The OECD (2012)
report made clear some of the problems with running a high debt. High debt can create
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vulnerabilities, exposing households, firms, and governments to solvency problems.
Balance sheet vulnerabilities can also lead to self-fulfilling runs or sudden stops of
normal economic output, and foreign capital flows could dry up. Moreover, when
corporate and household debt is so high, a shock can induce forced cuts in investment,
employment and consumption with negative implications for government revenues and
spending. In addition, when asset prices move they can amplify shocks and
macroeconomic instability.
The OECD explains that the vulnerabilities created by debt, and the
interconnections between sectors, can transcend across these sectors. Typically, debt
builds up most rapidly in the private sector; therefore, when the economy enters a
recession, private-sector debt as a share of GDP decelerates or declines, raising the risk of
a recession and an economic crisis. The question arises as to how monetary and financial
market policy should react to the buildup in debt. The recent crisis highlights just how
costly and worrisome running a large debt can be. The OECD states, “The aim is to
address households whose debt levels are clearly unsustainable, while maximizing
returns to creditors by putting reasonable claims on debtors. In the United States, there
are differences in the ability of borrowers to walk away from mortgages. Where this is
possible, default rates on loans are higher.” Therefore, policies need to approach debt in a
way that reduces or eliminates the debt entirely. Yet, to approach debt with a monetary or
fiscal policy route depends on the situation and the type of debt.
Boshara and Emmons (2013) discuss how the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009
was damaging to household balance sheets. In particular, they examine the importance of
sound financial footing to families at the micro-level and the importance of healthy
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household balance sheets to the economy. For example, households with savings may
have fewer day-to-day financial worries, allowing them to be more future-oriented in
their economic and social decision-making. Conversely, the lack of savings and assets
can hurt the future consumption and security of the family. Boshara and Emmons state,
“Seventy percent of workers report withdrawing money from college and retirement
accounts in order to make ends meet, and these withdrawals will likely lead to losses of
wealth in future years.”7 These changes in household balance sheets, defined as wealth
effects, have short-term and long-term repercussions on the economy. For instance,
declining wealth in households decreases consumer spending, such that an unexpected
decline of 1 percent in house prices results in about a 0.10 percent in permanent decline
of consumer spending, while a 1 percent increase in house prices results in only about a
0.03 percent increase in consumer spending.
Therefore, when studying the Great Recession and the following weak recovery,
Boshara and Emmons believe that negative household wealth effects played an important
role. They consider the huge declines in asset values and net worth as one of the shocks
that threw the economy into a recession. In addition, the liability side of household
balance sheets could be detrimental to the economy in regards to default and
deleveraging. In terms of default, the large concentration of excess debt can have
negative implications to the economy. For example, in 2008 and 2009, real GDP fell 0.3
and 3.1 percent, which was worse than predicted. This means that when it comes to
deleveraging, households will be too concerned with paying down debt that they will
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increase their savings. As a result, when household debt becomes so large, they will
choose to save over consume, and it will in turn suffocate economic growth. Boshara and
Emmons suggest that policy responses involving debt restructuring can alleviate some of
the burdens weighing heavily on the economy.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Paul Krugman saw a return of depression
economics. Krugman (2009) explains more explicitly how recovery is bound to be a
prolonged process. He states that the global credit system is in a state of paralysis and
reform of the weakness that made the crisis is essential. However, two things need to
occur for the economy to escape the recession. Firstly, credit needs to be flowing and
secondly, spending needs to be stimulated. Credit has already been flowing, due to the
Fed pumping liquidity into the economy, but to increase spending more needs to be done
to stimulate individual consumption behavior. Krugman stresses the importance of very
large fiscal stimuli: in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and autos, insisting that these
responses are big enough to overwhelm systemic and psychological economic
depression.
2.3 Conclusions
The literature review explains how unconventional monetary policy made it
possible for the Federal Reserve to further fuel the economy after conventional monetary
policy was stuck in the zero-lower bound interest rate. Although unconventional
monetary policy helped to stimulate GDP through lower interest rates and increased
credit, there were no substantial effects in the real economy, because it is possible that the
wrong policy tools were implemented for a misdiagnosed problem. Households are
carrying large amounts of debt, and the Federal Reserve’s continuation of unconventional
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monetary policy is not helping those households to revert back to the normal
consumption and saving preferences. The next chapter will further discuss the
implications of debt overhang, unconventional monetary policy and fiscal policy after the
financial crisis.
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Chapter 3
Analytical Framework
The literature review explained how after the housing bubble burst and the stock
market fell, the Federal Reserve used many facets of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy to keep the economy afloat. The federal government even bailed out
banks and offered relief packages. This chapter will try to explain that the problems of
the financial crisis were misdiagnosed. It was not a crisis of confidence but rather a crisis
of debt. This chapter will examine some of the foundational elements in understanding
the relationship between debt overhang and unconventional monetary policy after the
financial crisis. The first section, Wealth Effects, examines debt overhang, how it is
measured and how it is impacted by the financial crisis. The second section,
Unconventional Monetary Policy, looks at the risk and liabilities of the Federal Reserve’s
balance sheet associated with unconventional monetary policy. Although these stresses
on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet are intended to lower interest rates, decrease
unemployment, and increase GDP; they can also have negative and long-term
consequences to the balance sheet. The third section, Fiscal Policy, examines the policies
enacted by the government and what the government could have done to accomplish
more.
3.1 Wealth Effects
Wealth effects are the change in spending, because of perceptions of wealth. People
typically spend more overall when one of two things are true: when people are actually
richer or when people perceive themselves to be richer. For example, when an
individual’s income increases or when the assessed value of an individual’s home

27

appreciates, and the fiscal amount of their liabilities do not change, then this can result in
an increase of an individual’s net worth. These changes in an economic agents’ wealth
can lead to an increase in the amount of consumption. So, a household’s consumption is
determined by its income (actual and expected), wealth, preferences, and its return on
savings. Thus, the uncertainty faced by a household also plays a role in consumption, as
does its ability to borrow.
Debt, on the other hand, does not typically exert an independent influence on
consumption in traditional models. Yet, borrowing is presumed to vary with
consumption, as the latter rises and falls in reaction to changes in its determinants. Debt
overhang is a debt burden that is so great that an entity cannot take on additional debt to
finance future projects. Krugman (1988) explains that debt overhang discourages future
investment, since all earnings from new projects would have to go to existing debt
holders, leaving little incentive for the investor to attempt to finance future projects. The
crisis emerged during the early to mid-2000s where many people took advantage of rising
home prices, easy credit conditions, and acquired large loans. After the financial crisis,
the problems of debt were exposed due to the housing market bubble burst and people
were eventually left with considerable debt overhangs.
The housing bubble was characterized by higher rates of household debt, lower
savings rates, higher rates of home ownership, and of course, higher housing prices.
Furthermore, it was fueled by low interest rates and large inflows of foreign funds that
created easy credit conditions. Figure 2, highlights the appreciation of households,
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reaching its peak in 2006. However, by 2008, household value declined by 20%.8 When
the value of a home drops below the size of the mortgage, a borrower could have zero to
negative equity. As a result, homeowners were left with few choices. They could be
constrained to large mortgage payments for a house that is below the value of the
mortgage, or a homeowner could walk away from their home, or opt for a foreclosure.
Nevertheless, the latter two options also cause negative, long-term effects on their credit
score, which could in turn affect their credit card debt.
Figure 2: The Rise and Fall of Housing Prices

Source: The Economist

When the house loses value and a homeowner’s mortgage is more than the value of
the house, depending on the individual’s balance sheet, the homeowner goes into zero or
negative equity. Table 2 shows an example of a homeowner’s balance sheet before the
housing bubble burst, while Table 3 indicates that when the house value drops 29 percent,
8
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the homeowner’s net worth drops from $100,000 to $0. This has a dramatic impact on a
consumer’s consumption and saving behavior. These tables illustrate debt overhang. Debt
!"#$

overhang is measured in one of two ways: a ratio of  !"#$%& or a ratio of  

!"#  !""#$"
!"#$%&

. These

fluctuations in an individual’s debt and net assets can severely reduce net worth. In
addition, these changes to an individual or businesses’ balance sheet affect the spender’s
consumption and saving behavior.
Table 2: Homeowner’s Balance Sheet Pre-2006 (In Thousands of Dollars)

Assets
House
Treasuries
Checking Account
Savings Account
Art Collection
Car

Liabilities
$350
$150
$10
$15
$5
$20

Total

Mortgage
Credit Card
Car Loan
Student Loan

$550

$300
$50
$15
$85

Total
Net Worth

$450
$100

Table 3: Homeowner’s Balance Sheet After 2006 (In Thousands of Dollars)

Assets
House
Treasuries
Checking Account
Savings Account
Art Collection
Car
Total

Liabilities
$250
$150
$10
$15
$5
$20

Mortgage
Credit Card
Car Loan
Student Loan

$450

$300
$50
$15
$85

Total
Net Worth

Dynan (2012) found highly leveraged households had larger declines in spending
than their less leveraged counterparts, even though there were smaller changes in net
worth. This suggests that their debt weighed on their consumption beyond what would
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$450
$0

have been predicted by wealth effects alone. In addition, many households found
themselves underwater due to the fact that their mortgages often came to exceed the value
of their homes, and they had limited, if any, ability to borrow more money, refinance
their mortgages, or sell their homes. In the face of such a financial shock to their net
worth, it made it difficult for homeowners to make their (relatively high) mortgage
payments. Dynan states:
Household’s mortgage leverage ratio of 10 percent is associated with a
reduction in annual consumption growth of a few tenths of a percentage point.
With the roughly half of Americans who have mortgages experiencing
considerable jumps in leverage as a result of the roughly one-third decline in
home prices nationwide, one might conclude that excessive leverage is having
a noticeable (albeit modest) damping effect on aggregate consumption
growth.
Despite the efforts of the central bank and the government, important financial strains
persisted. Dynan found that there was essentially no reduction of debt between 2009 and
2011. The sample of homeowners reported that they were somewhat or very likely to
have problems making their mortgage payments over the coming year. Furthermore,
Dynan found that it might take many years for some households to reduce their leverage
to pre-crisis norms. The effects of deleveraging on the economy could thus persist for
some time to come. Dynan’s results reiterate how inhibiting it is for debtors to continue
with normal consumption behavior, when they already have overhanging payments due
to mortgage debt.
After the financial crisis, mortgage debt is still one of the largest contributors of
debt for households. Figure 3 illustrates household debt as a ratio compared to disposable
income. Although mortgage debt is a large composition of debt overhang, it is not the
only type of debt. Other household debt includes personal, credit card, and student loan
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debt. Figure 4 measures debt overhang in the United States. This chart shows household
debt in terms of a percentage of the United States GDP. It also compares household debt
to financial and nonfinancial corporate business debt. Both charts illustrate how debt has
grown significantly since the financial crisis.
Figure 3: Aggregate Ratio of Household Debt to Disposable Personal Income, 1980–2011Q4

Source: Dynan (2012) calculations from Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve) data and National Income and
Product Accounts (Bureau of Economic Analysis) data.
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Figure 4: Growth of Debt Overhang in the US

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

Dynan (2012) also mentions when policymakers gauge whether additional fiscal
and monetary stimulus is needed, they must understand how the still-elevated level of
aggregate household leverage affects the underlying strength of the economy. Moreover,
a better understanding of the implications of high leverage might shed light on the
benefits of specific policy interventions. Dynan notes how some analysts have argued for
improvements in programs that allow “underwater” borrowers to refinance, so that more
households can benefit from the low mortgage rates that have resulted from
accommodative monetary policy. Other analysts have advocated for reducing mortgage
principal in order to revive the economy. The next two sections will highlight how
monetary and fiscal policies are only getting at the surface of the true underlying
economic issue: debt overhang.
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3.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve operates with a sizable balance sheet that includes a large
number of distinct assets and liabilities. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet contains a
great deal of information about the scale and scope of its operations. Over recent years,
the development and implementation of a number of new lending facilities to address the
financial crisis have increased the complexity of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. In
the literature review, Krugman et al (2012) and Putnam (2013) suggest that there are
long-term risks to the economy with such an unprecedented growth in the balance sheet.
There are a number of factors affecting the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. On
the asset side, there are both direct and indirect operations. In the current circumstances,
direct factors include: holdings of Treasury, agency, mortgage-backed securities, discount
window lending, lending to other institutions, assets of limited liability companies
(LLCs) that have been consolidated onto the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and foreign
currency holdings associated with reciprocal currency arrangements with other central
banks (foreign central bank liquidity swaps). For instance, after the financial crisis many
depository institutions were short on liquidity. Thus, the Federal Reserve set discount
window lending for eligible institutions to have access to primary credit, secondary
credit, and seasonal credit, providing these institutions liquidity on a short-term basis
with a low interest rate. In addition, the Federal Reserve’s largest component on the asset
side of the balance sheet has been through the transactions of large-scale asset purchases
of mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and treasury securities by the various
rounds of QE
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One of the indirect factors that affect assets include the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York’s holdings of securities on behalf of foreign official and international
institutions. Market participants often look for trends in these data to gauge foreign
demand for U.S. Treasury and agency securities. Another indirect factor that affects
assets includes the securities that the Federal Reserve lends from its portfolio of Treasury
securities and federal agency debt securities to foster efficient and liquid trading in the
market. When securities are lent, they continue to be listed as assets of the Federal
Reserve because the Federal Reserve retains ownership of the securities. Figure 5a details
the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and Figure 5b highlights when QE
was executed.

Figure 5a: Selected Assets of the Federal Reserve

Source: Federal Reserve
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Figure 5b: Selected Assets of the Federal and QE executions

Source: Federal Reserve

The graphs detail the changes the Federal Reserve balance sheet experienced during
and after the financial crisis. For example, the level of securities held outright declined at
the end of 2007 and into 2008. As the Federal Reserve sold Treasury securities to
accommodate the increase in credit extended through liquidity facilities, the various
liquidity facilities significantly slowed down over the course of 2009. The level of
securities holdings has risen significantly since 2009, principally reflecting purchases of
Treasury, agency, and agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities under QE
announced by the FOMC.
There are many components on the liability side of the Federal Reserve balance
sheet, as well. For instance, U.S. currency has historically been the largest liability for the
Federal Reserve. The quantity of Federal Reserve notes held by the public has grown
over time. The increase in Federal Reserve notes reduce the quantity of reserve balances
held by depository institutions and push the federal funds rate above the target set by the
FOMC. To prevent that outcome, the Federal Reserve engages in open market operations
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to offset the reduction in reserve balances.
The Federal Reserve also conducts reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos or
RRPs) by selling Treasury securities and federal agency debt securities to counterparties
who agree to sell them back to the Federal Reserve on a stated future date. During nonrecessionary periods, the Federal Reserve executes occasional reverse repos with primary
dealers; these transactions temporarily reduce the supply of reserve balances and thus
help bring the federal funds rate back up to the target set by the FOMC. During the fall of
2008, the Federal Reserve executed a sequence of overnight reverse repos with primary
dealers, as part of its response to the financial crisis. These transactions offset a modest
amount of the reserve balance increase that resulted from the expansion of the Federal
Reserve's liquidity facilities. Yet, an even more important effect of these transactions was
to make more Treasury securities available to private agents so that they can use the
securities as collateral in money market transactions and thereby improve the functioning
of the money markets.
Deposits of depository institutions are borrowed or lent in bank funding markets,
such as the federal funds market. Those transactions move funds from the lender's
Federal Reserve account to the borrower's account, but do not change the total amount of
balances that the banking system holds at the Federal Reserve Banks. Therefore, the
deposits of depository institutions play a role in regards to open market operations. This
is because the Fed decreases the sales of securities to decrease the level of deposits of
depository institutions, so depository institutions will increase loans to investors and
consumers. In times of crisis, the FOMC may set a lower federal funds rate target to spur
greater economic activity.
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The federal funds rate is the central interest rate in the U.S. financial market. It
influences other interest rates such as the prime rate, which is the rate banks charge their
customers with higher credit ratings. Additionally, the federal funds rate indirectly
influences longer-term interest rates such as mortgages, loans, and savings, all of which
are very important to consumer wealth and confidence. In Figure 6, it shows how the
Federal Reserve has targeted the federal funds rate to be close to zero since 2008.
Figure 6: Federal Funds Rate (1970-2015)

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

Figure 7a, details how since the Great Recession, the liabilities side of the balance
sheet has grown significantly over time, especially with the amount of currency in
circulation. Moreover, Figure 7b details when QE was executed.
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Figure 7a: Liabilities on the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

Source: Federal Reserve

Figure 7b: Liabilities on the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet and QE executions

Source: Federal Reserve

Although unconventional and conventional monetary policies have been exhausted,
as Friedman (2014) and Krugman et al (2012) have expressed, there are concerns with
these large financial pressures on the balance sheet of the central banks. Krugman and
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Eggertsson (2012) in particular notice that the current economic conditions of low
interest rates and low inflation will be problematic for macroeconomic management
when it comes time to unwind unconventional monetary policy. Based on Krugman and
Eggertsson (2012) study, they use Fisher, Minsky, and Koo analysis to explain how three
problems could occur. According to Fisher (1933), deflation could occur and Minsky
(1986) states that debt will keep rising for private individuals. As a result of debt and
deflation, a balance sheet recession could occur, because such a distress on balance sheets
will prevent individual spending due to debt. They argue that if a slump is to be avoided,
the government should spend more to compensate for the fact that debtors are spending
less; yet even a zero nominal interest rate may not be low enough to induce the needed
spending, so fiscal policy must be used.
3.3 Fiscal Policy
While the central bank acted as a “lender of last resort,” the Federal government
bailed out some banks and implemented policies to balance the distressed economy. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, sometimes referred to as the bailout of
the U.S. financial system, was a law enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis,
authorizing the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion on
distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities, and to supply cash directly to the
banks.
Within this policy was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a program that
purchases distressed assets as an additional way to inject capital into banks and other
financial institutions, while the Treasury continued to examine the usefulness of targeted
asset purchases. An important goal of TARP was to encourage banks to resume lending
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again at levels seen before the crisis, both to each other and to consumers and businesses.
As banks gain increased lending confidence, the interbank lending interest rates (the rates
at which the banks lend to each other on a short term basis) should decrease, further
facilitating lending. If TARP can stabilize bank capital ratios, it should theoretically
allow them to increase lending, as opposed to saving cash, to mitigate future unforeseen
losses from troubled assets. The government hoped that the increased lending would
equate to “loosening” of credit, ultimately to restore order in the financial markets and
improve investor confidence in financial institutions and the markets.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act also provided additional benefits to
individuals. Those benefits provided the alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief, energy
tax credits, and disaster relief for individuals. It also extended the availability of the
exclusion from gross income of discharges of qualifying mortgage debt and several other
provisions affecting individuals that expired at the end of 2007 or were scheduled to
expire at the end of 2009.9
Critics of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act point to two issues: moral
hazard and the increased deficit for the U.S. government. Moral hazard occurs when one
party takes on more risks because someone else bears the burden of those risks. Moral
hazard also arises when the party with more information about its actions or intentions
has a tendency or incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party
with less information. Neil Barofsky, special inspector general for TARP, states that
TARP largely spared, “Executives, shareholders, creditors and counter parties,
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reinforcing that not only would the government bail out the largest institutions, but would
do so in a manner that would do little harm to the responsible stakeholders.”10 Barofsky
states that TARP and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act perpetuate the legacy of
“Too Big to Fail”. Although, moral hazard has been a negative externality of this
legislation, for the purposes of this paper, this subject will not be investigated any further.
Instead, this paper will focus on the importance of federal government intervention and
the issues of the federal bailout cutting into the federal deficit.
In February 2009, Congress also passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. This legislation is commonly referred to as the “stimulus” or the
“stimulus package.” The goals of this act were to create new jobs and save existing ones,
encourage economic activity and invest in long-term growth, as well as to promote
unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government spending. These
goals were going to be accomplished by tax cuts and benefits for millions of working
families and businesses, funding for entitlement programs, like unemployment benefits,
and funding for federal contracts, grants and loans. Spending estimates for the act were
approximately $787 billion, but in 2011, the expenditure was raised to $840 billion.
Paul Krugman argues that there was not enough stimulus or government money
spent on the bailout. He explains that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
“…was too small and too short-lived given the depth of the slump: stimulus spending
peaked at 1.6 percent of GDP in early 2010 and dropped rapidly thereafter, giving way to
a regime of destructive fiscal austerity. And the administration’s efforts to help
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homeowners were so ineffectual as to be risible.”11 The Recovery Act never reached that
level of spending; even if tax cuts of dubious effectiveness were included, it only briefly
grazed that target in 2010, before rapidly fading away. Krugman also argues that even
TARP did not cost enough money.
As a result, Krugman is highly critical of politicians for not pumping more money
into the Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Krugman is specifically critical of Timothy
Geithner’s position on the stimulus. Geithner states, “$800 billion over two years was
considered extraordinarily aggressive, twice as much as a group of 387 mostly leftleaning economists had just recommended in a public letter.” Krugman claims that he and
other economists argued that the package was actually too small. The economists’ letter
called for spending amounts of $300 to $400 billion per year. The Recovery Act never
reached that level of spending; it only briefly grazed that target in 2010, before fading
away.
So why is there is a discrepancy between too much government money and not
enough? That is because economists are looking at structural deficit compared to the
current budget. The U.S.’s current budget deficit fluctuates sharply due to economic
conditions, while structural budget deficit is the difference between government spending
and revenues when the economy is stable. The cyclical deficit, like spending money on
economic recovery, will take care of itself as the economy recovers. Instead, the
government should only concentrate on long-term pressures on the structural budget
deficit. For example, spending on unemployment insurance is highly cyclical, whereas
spending on veterans’ health care and Social Security payments are mostly structural.
11

Krugman, Paul. "Does He Pass the Test?" The New York Review of Books. July 10, 2014.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jul/10/geithner-does-he-pass-test/.
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The ideal solution would be to organize a reduction of the structural deficit over a decade
through increases in tax revenue and cuts to spending. Figure 8 illustrates the difference
between actual deficit and structural deficit. According to this data, the structural deficit
is roughly 2 percent of GDP. The structural deficit indicates that larger amounts of
stimulus spending would have been attainable for the U.S. government during the
financial crisis.
Figure 8: Structural Deficit v. Actual Deficit
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Conclusion
Although, monetary and fiscal policy was expanded to help the economy, the Great
Recession, was not a crisis of confidence, but a crisis of debt. At banks, federal deposit
insurance assures depositors that they will not lose their money, preventing bank runs.
Although shadow banks do not rely on traditional deposits, instead these banks like
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Lehman Brothers, raise money through various forms of short-run borrowing eventually
found themselves suffering from banks runs- yet, the actions of the Federal Reserve and
the government were able to stabilize financial markets. However, the issue of debt
overhang is still lingering in the economy. After the financial crisis, households were left
with large mortgage debt and other personal debt. The only way to stimulate real wages,
consumer spending and GDP is through debt relief and fiscal stimulus. With the
continuation of unconventional monetary policy pumping through the economy, these
low interest rates and low prices could possibly raise the risk for deflation, more debt, or
another recession.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis
This next section analyzes the relationship between debt overhang and
unconventional monetary, and whether unconventional monetary policy is effective in
dealing with debt overhang. As touched upon earlier, unconventional monetary policy
lowers interest rates and provides liquidity to financial institutions, stimulating GDP. The
first section, Graphical Analysis, is a foundation for the following subsections. These
graphs detail the components of GDP and the relationship to interest rates, before and
after the financial crisis. The second section, Interest Rate Channel, examines whether
the decreased interest rates significantly affected consumption and investment. The third
section, Credit Channel, studies if the Federal Reserve’s expansion of the balance sheet
significantly affected consumption and investment. The final section, Interpretation,
examines the big picture meaning of the regression results. Although, unconventional
monetary policy provides liquidity to financial institutions and creates a low interest rate
environment to stimulate consumption and investment, debt overhang also affects
consumption and investment, which can morph the environment that the Federal Reserve
is trying to create. Thus, debt overhang is significantly affecting consumption and
investment.
4.1 Graphical Analysis
This section looks at the big picture changes of how consumption, net assets as a
percentage of disposable income, and investment were affected before and after the
financial crisis. With these representation established, the next two sections examine how
unconventional monetary policy’s interest rate and credit channel increases consumption
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and investment. The data used for this analysis was collected from the Federal Reserve’s
database. The quarterly data was collected from 1990 to 2014, to encompass not only the
Great Recession, but also non-recessionary periods in the U.S. economy.
The reason why it is important to be concerned with consumption and investment
is that they are the largest components of GDP. The expenditure equation for GDP is:
𝑌 =𝐶+𝐼+𝐺+ 𝑋−𝑀
From this equation the economy can be broken down as such: where Y is GDP; C
is consumption the largest component of the economy including household final
consumption expenditures, like goods and services; the second largest component is I, or
investment of businesses into physical capital, such as building a new building;
G is government spending; (X-M) is net exports. Figure 9a highlights how much
consumption and investments make up GDP.
Figure 9a: GDP, Investment, and Consumption (1990-2014)
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Since consumption and investments are the largest component of GDP, it will be
beneficial for this analysis to see the effects of consumption and investment before and
after the financial crisis, and to see if the inverse relationship remains between interest
rate, consumption and investment. Figure 9a also illustrates how the Great Recession
affected GDP and its constituents. Since 1990, there has been constant growth, but when
the financial crisis hit in Q4 of 2007 it negatively influenced GDP, consumption, and
investment. From 2008 to 2009: GDP fell -1.53 percent, C fell -0.97 percent and I fell 9.31 percent. In the regression analysis sections, the dependent variables will be
investment and consumption of durable goods, because these variables are sensitive to
low interest rate and an abundant credit environment. Figure 9b, highlights how the
financial crisis impacted investment more than consumption of durable goods.
Figure 9b: Investment and Consumption of Durable Goods
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It is also important to examine how consumption is affected by individual balance
sheets. For instance, when an individual has more net assets they are more likely to
consume durable goods like cars or other big-ticket items, while businesses make
investments into their homes or businesses. Figure 10 details net assets as a percentage of
disposable income. It is interesting to note that right before the housing bubble burst in
2006, net assets as a percentage of disposable income was at its height of 651 percent of
disposable income and then it fell to 506 percent in Q1 of 2009, falling 22 percent or an
average of

-6.85 percent a year. This indicates that not only did individual’s net worth

fall, but also their debt grew. In addition, this graph shows that net assets have not
returned to the level it was at in its zenith from 2006 to 2007. The data also indicates that
net assets as a percentage of disposable income has fallen on average of -3.36 percent
from 2012 to 2014. For the regression analysis, this data will be used as a variable of debt
overhang.
Figure 10: Net Assets as a percentage of Disposable Income
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Although the graphs seen thus far highlight how consumption, investment and
individual balance sheets were affected after the financial crisis, but how does that affirm
whether unconventional monetary policy was effective or not? Well in previous chapters,
it was explained that unconventional monetary policy is supposed to lower interest rates
to ultimately stimulate investment and consumption, particularly consumption of durable
goods. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show how there is an inverse relationship between
interest rates and investments, where lower interest rates creates an environment where
individuals or businesses are more apt to take out loans and invest in physical capital.
Figures 13 and 14 assess the correlation between investment and interest rates.
Figure 11 is a graph of real total investment versus the prime rate. Again real total
investment is the total investments in the economy that businesses invest into physical
capital. The prime rate is the base rate that banks use to set the price or interest rate on
many of their commercial loans and some of their consumer loan products. Economic
theory explains that as interest rates decrease investments should increase. Case in point,
between 2000 and 2004, where the prime rate decreased on average -9.70 percent and
real total investment increased on average 4.66 percent. However, this theory was not
significant during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 as the prime rate dropped to
-23.92 percent and has stayed at the 3.25 percent level, where investments fell -6.16
percent.
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Figure 11: Real Total Investment vs. Prime Rate
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Figure 12 shows a similar relationship between real total investment and the 10year Treasury rates. The 10-year rates are closely tied to long-term interest rates, as a
result we can see if the investment and interest rate relationship is significant in the long
run. Figure 12 shows a similar relationship as shown in Figure 11, for instance between
2007 and 2009, when the 10 year interest rate fell -11.79 percent and investments also
fell -6.16 percent.
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Figure 12: Real Total Investment v. 10 year
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Although both graphs show how investment increased after 2008, the inverse
relationships are not that significant after the financial crisis. Figure 13a is a scatter graph
of real investment and the 10 year treasury rate between 1990 Q1 to 2007 Q3, right
before the Great Recession, and the graph shows a significant relationship between low
interest rates stimulate higher levels of investment, and higher interest rates lower the
levels of investment. However, Figure 13b shows the relationship after the financial crisis
from 2007 Q4 to 2014 Q14, and the graph is less significant. There is not a strong
correlation relationship between interest rates and investment.
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Figure 13a: Investment v. 10 year (‘90 Q1- ‘07Q3) Figure 13b: Investment v. 10 year (‘07Q4- ‘14Q4)
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Figure 14a: Investment v. r (‘90Q1- ‘07Q3)

Figure 14b: Investment v. r (‘90Q1- ‘07Q3)
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To reinforce this argument, a scatter plot was designed to show the relationship
between real investments and real interest rates. Real interest rates are the interest rates
that have been adjusted to remove the effects of inflation to reflect the real cost of funds
to the borrower, and the real yield to the lender. The real interest rates or (r) is calculated
by using the Fisher equation, which states that the real interest rate is approximately the
nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate, or in this case 10-year treasury yields less
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inflation rate. Figure 14a shows the strong inverse relationship between real investment
and real interest rates between 1990Q1 and 2007Q3. Similarly to Figure 13b, Figure 14b
also shows how this relationship falls apart. Although, this is not a definitive explanation
that unconventional monetary policy is ineffective, it does suggest that unconventional
monetary, a policy that lowers interest rates, does not have a strong correlation in
increasing investments after the financial crisis. As a result, there must be other factors
affecting this relationship, so the next two subsections will delve into the significance of
these other variables.
4.2 Interest Rate Channel
Although the scatter plots and graphs give a good physical representation of what is
going on, through regression analysis there is a better understanding of the significance of
unconventional monetary policy. The interest channel examines how monetary policy
changes nominal interest rates and price level, subsequently affecting output and
employment. According to times of recession, a decline in the long-term real interest
rates reduces both the cost of borrowing and the money paid on interest-bearing deposits.
Therefore, the low interest rate environment encourages household spending on durable
goods, as well as increased investing by investors. The rise in investments and durable
goods purchased, boosts the level of aggregate demand and employment. Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) investigated how quantitative easing affects various
interest rates and the impact of macroeconomic behavior. They argued that QE signals a
decrease in nominal interest rates, an increase in inflation expectations, and a decrease in
corporate bond default risk. As a result encouraging market participants to invest and
consume.
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In examining real investment, there will also be a comparison to consumption of
durable. Therefore, the first regression is to examine the relationship between real
investment and real interest rates. In a low interest rate environment, it is assumed that
businesses would be more apt to invest in certain aspects of their enterprise, like taking
out a loan to expand their building, to buy new equipment, etc. Thus, it is expected that
there would be a significant relationship between real investment and real interest rates.
The equation below measures investment as the dependent variable compared to real
interest rates, the change in GDP and net asset as a percentage of disposable income. The
equation:
𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽! 𝑁𝐴𝑃𝐶
Table 4 shows that real interest rates and net assets as a percentage of disposable income
are significant, whereas the change in GDP is not that significant. Although the results
intuitively make sense, where real interest rates inversely effect investment and net assets
directly affect investment, it does not pass the Durbin Watson test. The results indicate
that the coefficients are inflated because of autocorrelation.
Table 4: Investment and Interest Rate
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
D(GDP)
NAPC

-930.3883
-381.8874
0.359773
8.549687

349.9830
19.18133
0.318187
0.595321

-2.658381
-19.90933
1.130695
14.36147

0.0093
0.0000
0.2612
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.919812
0.917168
232.6554
4925698.
-650.4639
347.9446
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
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2759.731
808.3797
13.77819
13.88572
13.82164
0.584033

For comparison, it would be compelling to compare Table 4 to the consumption
of durable goods and interest rate relationship. For example, if individuals were in an
environment of low interest rates, they might be more responsive to buying a home, a car,
or a washing machine. Therefore, Table 5 compares consumption of durable goods to real
interest rates, a change in GDP, and net assets as a percentage of disposable income:
𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽! 𝑁𝐴𝑃𝐶
These results are also strong, the coefficients are statistically significant and the Rsquared close to one. Although, the regression does not pass the Durbin Watson test, the
other components of these results are significant.
Table 5: Consumption of Durable Goods and Interest Rates
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
D(GDP)
NAPC

413.4468
-160.4460
0.264363
1.578512

165.0440
11.71812
0.133509
0.293096

2.505070
-13.69213
1.980118
5.385648

0.0150
0.0000
0.0524
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.769867
0.758165
92.98800
510159.4
-372.8725
65.79100
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1031.570
189.0894
11.96420
12.10028
12.01772
0.495417

Appendix C uses variations of the regressions in Table 4 and Table 5 to resolve
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs for a variety of reasons, there could not enough
dependent variables in the equation, perhaps the wrong model is being used, or there is a
time series difference in the data. However, using methods such as lag effect for interest
rates, first-order autoregressive process, and logarithmic functions could help correct this
error. As seen in Appendix C, the significance of the coefficients were worse when the
adjustments for autocorrelation was taken into account, so Table 4 and Table 5 are the
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most significant results. For the next subsection, Appendix D will also examine the
problem of autocorrelation
These regressions shown in Table 4 and Table 5 indicate that real interest
stimulates investment and consumption of durable goods. It is also important to note that
net assets as a percentage of disposable income, the indicator of debt overhang, are also
statistically significant on investment and consumption of durable goods. Although
unconventional monetary policy created a low interest rate environment to increase
investment and consumption, it is important to note that wealth effects are statistically
significant to these outputs. As a result, unconventional monetary policy alone cannot
stimulate consumption and investment behavior
4.2 Credit Channel
The credit channel of monetary policy transmission is an indirect amplification
that works with the interest rate channel. The credit channel affects the economy by
altering the amount of access credit firms and/or households have to these funds. After
the financial crisis, it was important for central banks to create liquidity for financial
institutions. The Federal Reserve increases the availability of credit, and thus increases
agents’ spending and investment behavior, leading to an increase in output. ChodorowReich (2012) explains that credit matters because it not only allows interest rates to
remain low for loans, but Chodorow-Reich also found that lender health has an
economically and statistically significant effect on employment. If credit is contracted
from businesses, due to financial institutions’ lack of liquidity, it will negatively
influence employment at non-financial firms.
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As a result, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has been exceedingly expanded
due to unconventional monetary policy to stimulate the economy and to provide credit to
financial institutions. The assets and liabilities are a good measurement of unconventional
monetary policy, but another measurement of unconventional monetary policy that is
beneficial for this channel of analysis, is the monetary base. Monetary base is the portion
of the commercial banks’ reserves with the central bank, plus the total currency
circulating in the public and held at banks. An increase of the monetary base, like the one
after the financial crisis, will typically result in a much larger increase in the supply and
demand of deposits through the banks’ loan making or the money multiplier. As a result,
banks will be more likely to give out loans, stimulating consumption and investment.
With this much liquidity at financial institutions, there should be a significant relationship
between consumption and investment, and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and
monetary base.
However, Hubbard (1995) explains two ways in which having credit is not
enough to stimulate investment and consumption. For instance, if financial institutions
have credit available through open market operations, it does not mean they will lend it
out to borrowers. Especially after an economic crisis, banks are potentially more reluctant
due to the risk and cost of lending. Secondly, an individual’s economic situation affects
their accessibility to credit or their willingness to take out credit. For example, an adverse
shock to a borrower’s net worth increases the cost of external finance and decreases the
ability of the borrower to implement investment, employment and production plans.
Hubbard states, “Developing ways to incorporate borrower heterogeneity in both
economic models of money and credit and in forecasting is an important, practical task
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for economic modelers and policymakers.”12 As a result, the regressions will examine if
unconventional monetary policy, in terms of increasing credit, will positively stimulate
consumption and investment.
Table 6 and Table 7 represent real investment in relation to monetary base and
real investment compared to the assets and liabilities of the central bank’s balance sheet.
Table 6 measures investment based on real interest rates, net assets as a percentage of
disposable income and monetary base. The real interest rate coefficient should be
negative, while net assets and monetary base should be a positive coefficient:
𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! napc + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
Although the regression does not pass the Durbin Watson test, the coefficients are
statistically significant and the R-squared is almost at one; Appendix D shows other
regressions that compensate for autocorrelation, but Table 6 is the most statistically
significant result.
Table 6: Investment and Monetary Base
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
MOBASE

-1543.522
-316.2719
9.140154
0.000130

360.2564
26.56963
0.552323
4.28E-05

-4.284510
-11.90351
16.54857
3.035369

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0031

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.927388
0.925020
222.9306
4572219.
-653.2338
391.6700
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

12

2746.732
814.1376
13.69237
13.79922
13.73556
0.531529

Hubbard, R. Glenn. "Is There a “Credit Channel” for Monetary Policy?" National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1994. http://www.nber.org/papers/w4977.pdf.
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Table 7 is a regression model that measures real investment to the balance sheet
of the Federal Reserve. The regression measures real investment to real interest rates, net
assets as a percentage of disposable income, and the Federal Reserve’s assets and
liabilities. Real interest rates and the liability coefficient should be negative, while net
assets and the assets coefficient should be a positive coefficient.
log(𝐼) = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! log  (napc) + 𝛽! 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏
Table 7: Investment and the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
LOG(NAPC)
BASS
LIAB

1.810199
-0.047867
1.002670
5.89E-07
-5.78E-07

0.340306
0.005997
0.053030
5.95E-07
6.03E-07

5.319327
-7.981975
18.90768
0.990232
-0.959227

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3282
0.3434

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.910078
0.900855
0.024864
0.024111
102.7706
98.67694
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

8.148250
0.078966
-4.444116
-4.241367
-4.368927
1.374793

This regression comes close to passing the Durbin Watson test, where interest
rates and net assets are statistically significant, but the coefficient for the Federal
Reserve’s assets and liabilities are not statistically significant. This could be because the
Federal Reserve balance sheet is a representative of so many facets of unconventional
monetary policy that these variables could not be statistically significant compared to real
investment or there are not enough variables in this model. The only significant
coefficients are net assets as a percentage of disposable income and real interest rates.
These results reiterate the results in the interest rate channel, that individuals balance
sheet are important to investment.
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Table 8a, 8b, and 9 will makes similar comparisons as that in Table 6 and Table 7,
but the dependent variable is consumption of durable goods. Table 8a measures the
regression of consumption of durable goods based on real interest rates, net assets as a
percentage of disposable income and monetary base. Real interest rates coefficient should
be negative, while net assets and monetary base should be a positive coefficient.
𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! NAPC + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
Table 8a highlights that the variables fit the regression line and the coefficients
are statistically significant except for 𝛽! , yet the results are still inflated because of the
Durbin Watson Test.
Table 8a: Consumption and Monetary Base
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
MOBASE

151.5658
-97.78705
1.630358
9.00E-05

112.3416
10.40803
0.194948
1.05E-05

1.349151
-9.395350
8.363026
8.607608

0.1824
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.891201
0.885669
63.93668
241186.0
-349.2741
161.0943
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1031.570
189.0894
11.21505
11.35112
11.26857
0.477981

Although, additional tables of the regression are kept in Appendix D and Table 8b
real interest rates and 𝛽! are not significant, however this table highlights how this
regression was adjusted for autocorrelation and the results are more significant.
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Table 8b: Consumption and Monetary Base with AR(1)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
MOBASE
AR(1)

214921.8
0.431007
0.616587
-7.41E-05
0.999925

31231707
6.608931
0.166299
2.41E-05
0.010975

0.006882
0.065216
3.707691
-3.077367
91.11322

0.9945
0.9482
0.0005
0.0032
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.990351
0.989674
18.76181
20064.31
-267.1407
1462.653
0.000000

Inverted AR Roots

1.00

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1037.498
184.6357
8.778731
8.950274
8.846083
2.133624

Table 9 represents the strongest results from this regression analysis. The
equation examines the connection of consumption of durable goods dependent on real
interest rates, net assets as a percentage of disposable income, assets and liabilities
𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! napc + 𝛽! 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏
Table 9 shows that the coefficients are statistically significant and that there is a
strong R-square, furthermore, the equation almost passes the Durbin Watson Test.
Consumption of durable goods in relation the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is more
significant than Table 8a and Table 8b. Table 9 results are also more interesting than
Table 6 and Table 7, indicating that consumption of durable goods are more sensitive to
the credit available at financial institutions than investment. However, overall both
investment and consumption of durable goods are responsive to net assets as a percentage
of disposable income. Similar to the interest rate channel results, the Federal Reserve
actions of for creating liquidity are statistically significant factors for stimulating
consumption and investment, but the coefficients are so small that they do not directly
impact consumption and investment.
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Table 9: Consumption and The Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
LOG(NAPC)
BASS
LIAB

1.298319
-0.035979
0.871198
4.40E-06
-4.37E-06

0.322793
0.005965
0.050325
5.55E-07
5.61E-07

4.022143
-6.031458
17.31149
7.916443
-7.784759

0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.955690
0.951470
0.025121
0.026505
109.1034
226.4654
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

7.012826
0.114033
-4.429932
-4.233108
-4.355866
1.159489

4.3 Interpretation
What is the significance of these results? In the presence of unconventional
monetary policy, the low interest rate environment increases consumption and
investment; while the actual changes in the central bank’s balance sheet are statistically
significant do not directly impact consumption and investment. Ultimately, these results
in essence address the core concept of debt overhang. All of these tables show that the
coefficient for NAPC (net assets as a percentage of disposable income) is positive and
significant. Before explaining these results further, it is also important to point out that
some of these diagnostics are questionable and some of the other coefficients (like real
interest rate and monetary base) signs change. These inefficiencies are explained due to
auto correlation inadequacies in the data. For instance, the Durbin Watson is not passed
in the results, although Appendix C and D try to accommodate for this error, it was
difficult to fix autocorrelation. This means that the t-statistics of the results are
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overestimated, and hence a regression that appears to be significant may not be so. The
estimated variances of the parameters could be biased and inconsistent.13
However, the results of NAPC are robust with respect to all model specifications.
For example, Table 9 details these results and provides explanations for the thesis. For
instance, all else equal controlling for real interest rates, a one-unit decrease in the
interest rate, increases the consumption of durable goods by 36 billion dollars. In
addition, when NAPC increase by 1%, consumption of durable goods increases by
0.87%. To further suggest how important net assets are to consumption is to exam the
financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, where net asset fell 20 percent and from the
result indicated in Table 9 would correlate to a decreased consumption of durable goods
by 17 percent. This highlights the phenomenon of debt overhang after the financial crisis
and those impacts on consumption. Yet, the changes of the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet have no major, direct affect on consumption of durable goods. In regards to the
assets of the Federal Reserve’s balance, a one-unit increase in the assets on the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet only increases consumption of durable goods by 4,400 dollars.
These results indicate that unconventional monetary policy in regards to the change of the
central bank balance sheet are not as significant as compared to net assets and real
interest rates.
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, consumption and investment are
large components of GDP, roughly 80 percent. Figure 9b illustrates how from 2007 to
2008, investment declined more than consumption of durable goods. To study this
further, Table 10 and Table 11 compares investment and consumption of durable goods
13

Ramanathan, Ramu. "Chapter 9: Serial Correlation." In Introductory Econometrics with Applications,
380-383. 5th ed. San Diego, California: South-Western, 1989.
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to unconventional monetary policy, interest rates, and GDP. The equation for Table 10 is
shown as:
𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! NAPC + 𝛽! 𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
Table 10: Investment, Monetary Base, and GDP
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC(-1)
D(GDP(-1))
MOBASE

-1600.114
-302.5576
9.058846
0.533947
0.000170

385.3060
28.28824
0.588100
0.302495
4.32E-05

-4.152840
-10.69553
15.40359
1.765145
3.946068

0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0810
0.0002

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.930955
0.927852
215.3238
4126426.
-635.7927
300.0028
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

2773.376
801.6392
13.63389
13.76917
13.68853
0.526929

The equation for Table 11:
𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10 + 𝛽! NAPC + 𝛽! 𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
Table 11: Consumption of Durable Goods, Monetary Base, and GDP
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC(-1)
D(GDP(-1))
MOBASE

184.9961
-96.75884
1.549217
0.097632
9.40E-05

119.5947
11.06712
0.203583
0.095421
1.06E-05

1.546859
-8.742914
7.609759
1.023165
8.897238

0.1272
0.0000
0.0000
0.3104
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.895901
0.888844
65.01054
249355.8
-355.3802
126.9425
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1038.225
194.9921
11.26188
11.43054
11.32832
0.557258

These results, although adjusted for autocorrelation, are still slightly inflated due
to failing the Durbin Watson test. However, the results show something very interesting,
that the coefficients of the independent variables for investments are larger and more
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statistically significant than the coefficients of the independent variables for consumption
of durable goods. For example in Table 10, all else equal, a one-unit decrease in the
interest rate increases investment by 302.56 billion dollars. Moreover, all else equal, a
one-unit increase in NAPC increases investment by 9.06 billion dollars. Conversely,
Table 11 shows that, all else equal, a one-unit decrease in real interest rates increases
consumption of durable goods by 96.76 billion dollars, and a one unit increase in NAPC
increases consumption of durable goods by 1.55 billon dollars. The results show that
investors are more concerned with GDP and NAPC. As a result, when a crisis hits not
every aspect of the economy is not equally affected. Thus, debt overhang affects various
aspects of the economy preventing unconventional monetary policy to not be as effective.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The focus of this study was intended to examine whether or not unconventional
monetary policy was effective in combatting debt overhang. Over the course of this
analysis, the results indicate that unconventional monetary policy was effective in
stimulating consumption and investment behavior. Yet, the results also indicate that debt
overhang is statistically significant to the other effects of output, in particular investment
and consumption of durable goods.
This paper examines a very nuanced relationship, while there has been plenty of
literature about unconventional monetary policy and debt overhang, this relationship has
never been examined closely. Bernanke (2004) and Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2011) maintain that unconventional monetary was an important facet of the
recovery of the U.S. economy to stabilize the economy and increase consumption and
investment; which to some degree was necessary, so the economy would not react like it
did during the Great Depression. However, many economists as Labonte (2014) and
Friedman (2014) explain that it has been a slow recovery for the economy and it will
continue to be slow to return to the level it was at in 2007. Krugman and Eggertsson
(2014) claim that because of debt spreading after the financial crisis, it has morphed the
expected macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy and creating a slow economic
recovery. Furthermore, Boshara and Emmons (2013) explain that because individual’s
net worth have been negatively impacted from the financial crisis, and that some
consumers are not being able to consume and invest because of the debt overhang, which
slows down the growth of the economy.
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Although there are some shortcomings to this analysis; such as the simplicity of
the regression, the autocorrelation of the data, however, the contribution of this paper
shows debt overhang has a significant impact on investment and consumption behavior.
Indicating that unconventional monetary policy alone does not reduce the significance of
debt overhang. As a result, it is important that the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Federal
Government reexamine the alternative avenues to stimulate consumption and investment,
possibly through fiscal stimulus, debt forgiveness or restructuring of mortgages.
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Appendix B
Calculations for pages 51-52
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
2008-‐2009	
  
2007-‐2009	
  
2012-‐2014	
  

Average	
  Annual	
  Rates,	
  Per	
  Year	
  
	
  	
  
C	
  
I	
  
GDP	
  
NAPC	
  
-‐0.97%	
  
-‐9.31%	
  
-‐1.53%	
  
-‐10.18%	
  
0.10%	
  
-‐6.16%	
  
-‐0.43%	
  
-‐6.85%	
  
2.24%	
  
7.34%	
  
2.32%	
  
-‐3.36%	
  

Calculations for pages 53-54
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
2000-‐2004	
  
2007-‐2009	
  

Average	
  Annual	
  Rates,	
  Per	
  Year	
  
Prime	
  Rate	
   10	
  Year	
  Bond	
  
I	
  	
  
-‐9.70%	
  
-‐4.88%	
   4.66%	
  
-‐23.92%	
  
-‐11.79%	
   -‐6.16%	
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Appendix C
I. Investment Regressions and Interest Rate Channel
Table C.1 results to do not make equation more statistically significant, also GDP
should not be a negative coefficient
Table C.1 is accounting for lag in real interest rates
Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 20:17
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4
Included observations: 95 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
D(GDP)
NAPC

-1026.098
-369.0486
-0.138656
8.746378

375.4151
20.29296
0.335467
0.637524

-2.733235
-18.18604
-0.413324
13.71929

0.0075
0.0000
0.6803
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.907329
0.904274
250.1091
5692464.
-657.3361
296.9912
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

2759.731
808.3797
13.92286
14.03040
13.96632
0.552947

Table C.2 results also do make it more significant, actually, it is less than Table 4.
Table C.2 log application
Dependent Variable: LOG(I)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 20:22
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4
Included observations: 95 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
D(GDP)
LOG(NAPC)

-4.130426
-0.150142
0.000189
1.965737

1.078618
0.009641
0.000159
0.169480

-3.829368
-15.57295
1.188434
11.59867

0.0002
0.0000
0.2378
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.880373
0.876430
0.116182
1.228335
71.74115
223.2332
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

75

7.873105
0.330507
-1.426130
-1.318598
-1.382679
0.388107

II. Consumption of Durable Goods and Interest Rate Channel
Coefficients are not correct, real10 should be negative, and real10 and GDP are
not significant.
Table C.3 AR(1)
Dependent Variable: COD
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/04/15 Time: 11:51
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q2 2014Q1
Included observations: 60 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
D(GDP)
NAPC
AR(1)

1366.149
0.185832
0.019056
0.636073
0.984683

749.1513
7.178688
0.026033
0.179989
0.015031

1.823595
0.025887
0.732017
3.533946
65.50927

0.0736
0.9794
0.4673
0.0008
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.987731
0.986839
19.94351
21875.91
-262.1002
1106.964
0.000000

Inverted AR Roots

.98

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1024.883
173.8413
8.903340
9.077869
8.971608
2.309896

Table C.4 Lag of interest rates
Dependent Variable: COD
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 20:31
Sample: 1999Q1 2014Q1
Included observations: 61
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
D(GDP)
NAPC

525.4170
-146.5692
0.049408
1.361296

172.6648
12.21830
0.139423
0.307640

3.042988
-11.99588
0.354375
4.424971

0.0035
0.0000
0.7244
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.724323
0.709814
96.14085
526854.6
-363.0013
49.92122
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
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1018.967
178.4717
12.03283
12.17125
12.08708
0.436474

Table C.5 Log
Dependent Variable: LOG(COD)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 20:34
Sample: 1999Q1 2014Q1
Included observations: 61
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
D(GDP)
LOG(NAPC)

1.970724
-0.158067
0.000191
0.824769

1.124908
0.012508
0.000141
0.178152

1.751898
-12.63764
1.355140
4.629566

0.0852
0.0000
0.1807
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.743071
0.729548
0.095179
0.516369
58.98488
54.95041
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
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6.910585
0.183020
-1.802783
-1.664365
-1.748536
0.451434

Appendix D
I. Investment Regressions and Credit Channel
Table D.1 Investment with lag effect
Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 23:17
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4
Included observations: 95 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
NAPC
MOBASE

-1523.019
-307.0104
9.072288
0.000134

397.3898
29.51114
0.602535
4.73E-05

-3.832556
-10.40320
15.05687
2.828528

0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0058

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.914659
0.911845
240.0151
5242260.
-653.4225
325.1017
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

2759.731
808.3797
13.84047
13.94801
13.88392
0.504915

Table D.2 Investment with AR(1)
Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 23:21
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4
Included observations: 95 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
MOBASE
AR(1)

-1964.968
6.963761
1.283207
-0.000249
1.007924

2948.950
11.96681
0.353061
5.70E-05
0.005533

-0.666328
0.581923
3.634524
-4.365735
182.1560

0.5069
0.5621
0.0005
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Inverted AR Roots

0.996862
0.996722
46.28193
192781.5
-496.5324
7146.784
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1.01
Estimated AR process is nonstationary
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2759.731
808.3797
10.55858
10.69299
10.61289
1.124294

Table D.3 with lag effect
Dependent Variable: I
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/05/15 Time: 23:51
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q1 2013Q4
Included observations: 44 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
NAPC
BASS
LIAB

198.8614
-140.2782
5.770472
0.002086
-0.002037

242.3812
24.99530
0.373050
0.002441
0.002472

0.820449
-5.612184
15.46837
0.854459
-0.824060

0.4169
0.0000
0.0000
0.3981
0.4149

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.870990
0.857758
101.9809
405604.2
-263.2700
65.82548
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

3467.783
270.3990
12.19409
12.39684
12.26928
0.841897

II. Consumption of Durable Goods and Credit Channel
Table D.4 With Lag Effect
Dependent Variable: COD
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/06/15 Time: 00:09
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2014Q3
Included observations: 63 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
NAPC
MOBASE

193.1596
-92.04028
1.536232
9.32E-05

121.8385
11.23837
0.209020
1.13E-05

1.585374
-8.189825
7.349695
8.219896

0.1182
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.872906
0.866444
69.10343
281741.8
-354.1699
135.0744
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
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1031.570
189.0894
11.37047
11.50654
11.42399
0.417901

Table D.5 with log adjustments
Dependent Variable: LOG(COD)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/06/15 Time: 00:20
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2014Q3
Included observations: 63 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
LOG(NAPC)
MOBASE

1.362798
-0.110152
0.891562
7.43E-08

0.857595
0.012501
0.135789
1.25E-08

1.589093
-8.811299
6.565766
5.927803

0.1174
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.845280
0.837412
0.076650
0.346634
74.48945
107.4443
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

6.921535
0.190093
-2.237760
-2.101688
-2.184242
0.392190

Table D.6 Raw
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
BASS
LIAB

-13.97489
-39.85792
1.642414
0.003822
-0.003775

67.04291
7.169353
0.104071
0.000666
0.000673

-0.208447
-5.559486
15.78169
5.741073
-5.611973

0.8359
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.950689
0.945992
30.18243
38261.13
-224.1881
202.4328
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
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1117.957
129.8753
9.752685
9.949509
9.826752
1.013279

Table D.7 with Lag
Dependent Variable: COD
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/06/15 Time: 00:23
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q1 2014Q3
Included observations: 47 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10(-1)
NAPC
BASS
LIAB

-12.16797
-34.73243
1.618963
0.003872
-0.003823

72.79750
7.765801
0.112476
0.000722
0.000729

-0.167148
-4.472484
14.39384
5.365290
-5.243325

0.8681
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.942016
0.936494
32.72915
44990.29
-227.9954
170.5846
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1117.957
129.8753
9.914697
10.11152
9.988764
0.753782

D.7 With AR(1)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/06/15 Time: 00:25
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q2 2014Q3
Included observations: 46 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 21 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
REAL10
NAPC
BASS
LIAB
AR(1)

388.0076
3.814052
0.547013
-0.000996
0.000926
1.031384

283.3564
6.841688
0.188432
0.002145
0.002144
0.014834

1.369327
0.557472
2.902968
-0.464082
0.432007
69.52615

0.1785
0.5803
0.0060
0.6451
0.6681
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Inverted AR Roots

0.983229
0.981133
17.25807
11913.64
-193.0775
469.0165
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1.03
Estimated AR process is nonstationary
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1123.463
125.6429
8.655545
8.894063
8.744895
2.308736

